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Abstract  
Impairments in social cognition may reflect dysfunction of disorder specific or disorder 
general mechanisms. Although cross-disorder comparison may prove insightful, few studies 
have compared social cognition in different neuropsychiatric disorders. Parallel investigation 
of schizophrenia and Tourette syndrome (TS) is encouraged by similarities including the 
presence of problematic social behaviour, echophenomena, emotional dysregulation and 
dopamine dysfunction. Focusing on tests of social cognition administered in both disorders, 
this review aims to summarize behavioural, neurophysiological and neuroimaging findings, 
before exploring how these may contribute to clinical symptoms. Studies investigating social 
cognition (imitation, emotion recognition, and understanding of beliefs or intentions) in 
patients with schizophrenia or TS were identified from Web of Science and PubMed 
searches. Although findings indicate that socio-cognitive deficits are more apparent in 
schizophrenia, adults with TS can exhibit similar task performance to patients with paranoia. 
In both disorders, behavioral and neuroimaging findings raise the possibility of increased 
internal simulation of others’ actions and emotions, in combination with a relative under-
application of mentalizing. More specifically, dysfunction in neurobiological substrates such 
as temporo-parietal junction and inferior frontal gyrus may underlie problems with self-other 
distinctions in both schizophrenia and TS. These difficulties in distinguishing between 
actions and mental states linked to the self and other may contribute to a range of psychiatric 
symptoms, including emotional dysregulation, paranoia, social anhedonia and socially 
disruptive urges. Comparing different patient populations could therefore reveal common 
neuro-cognitive risk factors for the development of problematic social behaviors, in addition 
to markers of resilience, coping strategies and potential neuro-compensation mechanisms. 
Keywords: social cognition; mirror neuron system; mentalizing; schizophrenia; Tourette syndrome. 
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1. Introduction: Social cognition, schizophrenia and Tourette syndrome  
1.1. The importance of social cognition in neuropsychiatry 
Social cognition refers to the collection of skills needed for successful interaction with others, and that 
can allow one to take advantage of their social group (Frith, 2008). These skills include the capacity to 
empathise and the ability to understand mental states such as beliefs and intentions  (i.e. mentalizing, or theory of 
mind). Social interactions between patients and their families, colleagues, and health care professionals are 
frequently indicators of mental health needs, and social exchanges between patient and clinician influence 
assessment and diagnosis. Indeed, problems with social cognition can be crucial determinants of the presence of 
neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. autistic spectrum disorder, anti-social personality disorder). The importance of 
social cognition is such that studies have now been conducted across many neurological and psychiatric 
disorders, including movement disorders, the dementias, epilepsy, mood and anxiety disorders and more. This 
research offers critical insight into the phenomenological experience of living with these conditions, and the 
neuropsychological underpinnings of behavioral symptoms and functional impairment. 
Within the domain of social cognition, an important distinction has been highlighted between mirroring 
and mentalizing processes  (Grafton, 2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The Mirror Neuron System 
(MNS: Rizzolatti et al., 2009; Iacoboni, 1995; Iacoboni et al., 1999) underpins motor simulation of observed 
actions, providing a basis for imitation and recognition of action goals, facial emotions and non-verbal 
communication based on visual motor cues. However, mental states such as beliefs are less directly observable, 
and may therefore be determined through mentalizing based on semantic reasoning and autobiographical 
memory. Spunt and Lieberman (2012a) propose that a social cognitive task first activates the MNS (including 
inferior parietal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus: IFG), followed by mentalizing areas (ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction: TPJ, posterior superior temporal sulcus : STS, and anterior 
temporal lobe). While the MNS contains some areas that respond more to action perception, the mentalizing 
network appears to support abstract, modality independent representations of mental states (Spunt and 
Lieberman, 2012b). While the MNS is automatically engaged by pertinent social stimuli, mentalizing processes 
may involve more conscious deliberation about mental states (Van Overwalle et al., 2009). This is supported by 
evidence that the MNS operates more efficiently than the mentalizing system, as its activation is less affected by 
concurrent cognitive demands  (Spunt and Lieberman, 2013). Neurodevelopmental findings could support the 
idea that the MNS develops before mentalizing ability, as children can imitate from early infancy (Meltzoff, 
1988) and the understanding of mental states seems to progress from emotions and intentions (linked to action 
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goals), to more abstract desires, and finally beliefs (Wellman et al., 2004). More recently, studies have 
emphasized the importance of self-other distinctions in social cognition i.e. the ability to distinguish between the 
mental states of oneself and other people (e.g. see de Guzman et al., 2016) and have explored the 
neurodevelopmental underpinnings of this ability (Steinbeis, 2016). A failure in self-other differentiation when 
mirroring or mentalizing could lead to confusion, distress, and inaccurate mental state attribution. 
Other important concepts now becoming more widely applied within the social cognitive domain 
include those of hyper- and hypo-mentalizing. Hyper-mentalising, or ‘hyper-theory of mind’ (Abu-Akel, 1999) 
was perhaps first described in relation to schizophrenia, and is thought to involve unconstrained hypothesis 
generation relating to the attribution of knowledge to the self and/or others (Abu-Akel & Bailey, 2000). Crespi 
and Badcock (2008) further suggest that psychosis and autism may fall at opposite ends of the cognitive 
spectrum, given that social cognition can appear underdeveloped in autism (i.e. this disorder may most 
frequently feature hypo-mentalizing), but hyper-developed to a dysfunctional degree in those with psychosis. 
These concepts may prove useful in drawing cross -disorder comparisons. However, it is important to recognise 
the distinction between abnormalities of social cognition that reflect application deficits versus conceptual 
deficits (Abu-Akel & Bailey, 2000). 
Many psychiatric conditions could be construed as disorders of social interaction, although it is unclear 
whether patients’ social cognitive deficits reflect dysfunction of disorder specific or disorder general 
mechanisms (Schilbach, 2016). Cross-disorder comparison may prove insightful in this regard. One previous 
study (Gallagher and Varga, 2015) did consider the application of major theories of social cognition (theory 
theory; simulation theory; interaction theory) in relation to explaining the social cognitive difficulties of 
individuals with schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder. The authors concluded that some disorders may 
involve more generalised impairments in social cognition, whereas others may feature more circumscribed 
deficits. Another recent study (Bora et al., 2016) compared cognitive abilities including theory of mind in 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, suggesting that social cognition was more impaired in schizophrenia, and 
that such an approach may enhance diagnostic classification and treatment. Overall however, very few existing 
studies have compared social cognition in different neuropsychiatric disorders. This review will explore how 
abnormalities in social cognition and underlying brain function could help to explain the behavioral symptoms 
of both schizophrenia, and Tourette Syndrome (TS). Schizophrenia is widely accepted to involve disturbances in 
social cognition (e.g. Green et al., 2015), but only more recently have these skills  been implicated in TS (Eddy 
and Cavanna, 2013b). Investigation of these two disorders in parallel is encouraged by the presence of 
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problematic social behaviors in both conditions, in addition to other notable similarities , such as dopaminergic 
dysfunction and temporal lobe abnormalities . Exploring social cognition in both schizophrenia and TS could 
offer insight into how similar underlying problems with social cognition may manifest as alternative behavioral 
problems based on individual neurological differences, conditioned behavioral responses or various coping and 
compensation mechanisms.  
1.2. Schizophrenia 
The prevalence of schizophrenia has been estimated at between 0.5 (Saha et al., 2005) and 1% (e.g. 
Keith et al., 1991; DSM 2000 4th Ed as cited by Shultz et al., 2007) across all cultures. Genetic liability is high 
(about .81), with a concordance rate of 50% between identical twins (MacDonald and Schulz, 2009). Although 
childhood onset can occur (see Bartlett, 2014), most cases of schizophrenia are diagnosed between age 20-25 
(Walker et al., 2004). There is frequently an earlier prodromal phase, which involves gradual development of 
symptoms, social withdrawal, loss of interest in activities  and self-care, and emotional problems (Shultz et al., 
2007), including emotional dysregulation (see Aleman & Kahn, 2005; Livingstone et al., 2009) and difficulties 
in interpreting and describing one’s own emotions (i.e. alexithymia; see Fogley et al. 2014; O’Driscoll et al., 
2014). Schizophrenia is thought to be a neurodevelopmental disorder (Weinberger, 1987; Rapoport et al., 2012), 
involving early insult and a latent period through much of neurodevelopment, until the emergence of psychosis 
in late adolescence or early adulthood, perhaps at a point when compensatory mechanisms become inadequate 
(Insel, 2010). Those who go on to develop the condition often demonstrate motor, cognitive and social 
impairments during childhood (Goghari et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2010), including a high frequency of negative 
facial expressions and reduced responsivity in social situations (e.g. Dworkin et al., 1993; Walker et al., 1994; 
Walker et al.,1999). 
Early descriptions of schizophrenia (e.g. Bleuler, 1911) noted disturbances of association, affect and 
reality, including delusions and hallucinations, movement disturbance (e.g. catatonia), somatic symptoms, manic 
and melancholic states. Schneider’s (1959) first-rank symptoms distinguish between behavioral signs with an 
excess of ideas or sensory experience (positive symptoms) versus those which involve a decrease in behavior 
(negative symptoms). Negative symptoms include lack of motivation, anhedonia, flattened affect and social 
withdrawal; whilst common positive signs include delusions and hallucinations, such as command 
hallucinations, whereby patients perceive voices telling them to commit harmful or dangerous acts (Schultz et 
al., 2007). Based on previous factor analyses, three symptom domains (positive, negative and disorganized) are 
now widely accepted (Grube et al., 1998), with the disorganization dimension including symptoms such as 
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formal thought disorder, loose associations, bizarre behavior and inappropriate affect. The positive, negative and 
disorganized symptoms domains may be associated with distinct underlying neural correlates (Goghari et al., 
2010).  
A continuum model of schizophrenia is now widely accepted, such that schizophrenia falls within a 
larger spectrum of disorders  also including Schizotypal Personality Disorder, schizoaffective disorder and 
numerous other psychotic conditions, and experimental work now frequently includes ‘at risk’ populations. 
Symptoms are highly heterogenous, with severity of positive, negative and disorganized symptoms varying 
across time within and across individuals (MacDonald and Schulz, 2009). In addition to a distorted perception 
of reality, key characteristics of schizophrenia include excessive threat anticipation (Freeman, 2007), loss of 
volition (Goghari et al., 2010) and disturbed social function (Larson et al., 2010). Deterioration of social 
relations may be considered a “hallmark” of schizophrenia (Hooley, 2010), and social symptoms include 
echophenomena (i.e. mirroring of other people’s speech or actions; Peralta et al., 2010), and social anhedonia 
(e.g. Blanchard et al., 1998), which refers to a lack of pleasure from social interaction. A diagnosis of 
schizophrenia according to DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) criteria requires the presence of 
delusions, hallucinations or disorganized speech; plus at least one other symptom in the form of delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized/catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms; present for over 6 
months, and leading to impairment in one or more areas of functioning (social, occupational etc.). Presentation 
is typically chronic with an episodic exacerbation in symptoms, and while dopamine blocking agents are 
therapeutically beneficial, they have limited impact on negative symptoms , and a proportion of cases remain 
refractory (Van Sant and Buckley, 2011).  
1.3. Tourette syndrome 
Approximately 1% of school age children are thought to have TS, with a median age of onset between 
4 and 6 years of age (Leckman et al., 2006). The cardinal motor signs of TS are tics: repetitive, rhythmic and 
stereotyped movements and vocalisations  (Faridi and Suchowersky, 2003). They can be simple (e.g. blinking, 
grimacing, kicking) or complex (bending over, shouting certain words), and can occur in sequences. Tics 
characteristically wax and wane over time in severity and frequency (Coffey et al., 1994). Most people with tics 
experience a sensory-psychological urge before the tic is performed which can make the tic feel semi-voluntary, 
or ‘unvoluntary’ (Jankovic, 1997). There is usually a short period of relief after the tic, although most people 
with tics can suppress them for at least a short period of time. A diagnosis of TS indicates the presence of both 
motor and vocal tics  across 12 months (though not necessarily concurrently), with onset before age 18 (DSM-V: 
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APA, 2013). Tic severity tends to peak around puberty and reduce during early adulthood. It is currently unclear 
why tics affect more males than females, with a ratio of approximately 3-4:1 (Robertson, 2015). 
Some common symptoms of TS are linked to sensory stimuli. These include compulsions to make 
things look or feel ‘just right’ (e.g. Neal and Cavanna, 2013) e.g. to visually align objects. Such symptoms are 
suggestive of an overlap with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; for a review see Eddy and Cavanna, 2014). 
Other complex social symptoms initially described by Gilles de la Tourette (1885) include echophenomena and 
coprophenomena (obscene language or gestures). Between 25-50% of patients with TS may also exhibit urges to 
perform socially inappropriate behaviors, such as to insult people (Kurlan et al., 1996; Eddy and Cavanna, 
2013a). Emotions can influence tics, and emotion dysregulation, including difficulties with anger control, are 
quite common (e.g. Budman et al., 2003; Cavanna et al., 2015). Intrusive thoughts compelling acts of harm to 
the self or others can also feature in TS (Eddy and Cavanna, 2013; George et al., 1993; Robertson et al., 1989). 
TS is suggested to be heriditary (Comings, 1990; Pauls and Leckman, 1986; Deng et al., 2012), but a 
clear genetic marker is yet to be confirmed. The basal ganglia are implicated in the motor aspects of TS (e.g. 
Mink, 2001;2006). However, the neural mechanisms underlying complex context-related tics are poorly 
understood. Tics respond well to dopamine blocking medication (Eddy et al., 2011b), and elevated levels of 
dopamine in TS may help to explain many symptoms, including impulse control problems (Wright et al., 2012), 
jumping to conclusions (Eddy and Cavanna, 2014), and hyper-mentalizing (Eddy and Cavanna, 2015).  
While diagnosis of frank psychosis is rare in TS, some studies suggest that such symptoms are more 
common in these patients than the general population. Early studies suggested that the manifestations of TS can 
include hallucinations, paranoid ideation, schizotypal thinking, and psychosis (Comings, 1990; Comings and 
Comings, 1987, Comings and Comings, 1991; Kerbeshian and Burd, 1985, 1988; Sverd et al., 1993; Takeuchi et 
al., 1986). For example, Comings et al. (1987) reported that auditory hallucinations of voices were reported by 
14.6% of TS patients versus 2.1% of healthy controls (HC). A later study confirmed a higher prevalence of 
schizotypal traits in adults with TS than in the general population (Cavanna et al., 2007). In addition, a few 
studies have reported case series who exhibited tics in childhood and later developed schizophrenia, albeit 
generally with persisting tics (Müller et al., 2002; Takeuchi et al., 1986). Echophenomena (e.g. Peralta et al., 
2010), obsessive compulsive behaviors and catatonic like motor behaviors (Müller et al., 2002) are associated 
with both TS and schizophrenia. 
1.4. Review aims 
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Multiple intriguing parallels  in schizophrenia and TS include emotional dysregulation, socially 
dysfunctional behaviors, obsessive-compulsive features, and the efficacy of anti-dopaminergic drugs. 
Furthermore, overlapping characteristics include symptoms rarely reported in other psychiatric disorders, such 
as echophenomena and sensory distortions. Perhaps most importantly, both of these clinical populations can 
feature socially inappropriate or harmful urges. While such symptoms appear less severe in TS, patients’ self-
injurious and socially inappropriate urges may appear reminiscent of the command hallucinations seen in 
schizophrenia. It is possible that there is some shared etiological or developmental relationship between TS and 
schizophrenia. Whatever the case, s tudying the association between these symptoms and social cognition  across 
disorders may offer invaluable insight into the neuropsychological factors that contribute to dangerous and 
socially disruptive behaviors.  
This review first provides a background on the social cognition literature in schizophrenia and TS, 
summarising behavioral findings, followed by evidence of related abnormalities in brain function. Rather than 
an exhaustive systematic review of all studies, there is a focus on more commonly administered tasks  within 
core areas of social cognition (e.g. imitation, emotion recognition, understanding of beliefs) that have been 
investigated in both schizophrenia and TS, allowing cross-disorder comparison. The section after this explores 
how self-other distinctions may be compromised in these disorders, and how excessive mirroring and hypo -
mentalizing may contribute to symptoms such as emotional dysregulation, paranoia, social anhedonia (SA) and 
socially disruptive urges. Clinical implications, limitations of current knowledge and directions for future 
research are summarized in the final section. 
2. Findings on tests of social cognition 
2.1. Behavioral findings  
This section outlines  behavioral performance of patients with schizophrenia and TS on a range of tasks 
within the domain of social cognition. Papers were obtained through searches of Web of Science and PubMed 
between 06/2016 and 12/2016. Search terms were emotion; social cognition; theory of mind; mentalizing; or 
mirror neuron; plus at least one of Tourette; schizophrenia; psychosis. Abstracts were manually searched for 
relevance and studies are reported within themes where at least one study was available for each disorder. 
Firstly, studies likely to involve the MNS are considered, followed by related tasks involving recognition of 
overt emotional expressions , and empathy measures. Finally, mentalizing tasks involving inference about covert 
mental states such as beliefs and intentions are discussed.  These themes broadly align to the domains 
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‘experience sharing’, ‘social cue perception’, and ‘mentalizing’ (respectively), within in the model of empathy 
proposed by Green et al. (2015). Key findings are summarized in Table 1. 
2.1.1. Imitation and motor resonance. The MNS allows an observer to (overtly or covertly) simulate 
perceived actions in order to achieve both motor and emotional resonance with the observed actor (e.g. Brunet-
Gouet et al., 2006), and may contribute to recognition of actions and emotions in addition to imitation. A few 
studies have investigated imitation in schizophrenia, and have noted deficits when patients are asked to copy e.g. 
observed mouth movements or hand gestures, although it is unclear whether deficits reflect attention or motor 
problems (Park et al., 2008; Falkenberg et al., 2008). For example, reduced imitation of others’ head or body 
movement (Kupper et al., 2015) or laughing (Haker and Rossler, 2009) is often associated with negative 
symptoms. Nakagawa and Hoshiyama (2015) monitored the grip strength of patients with schizophrenia and HC 
when watching actors grip at different strengths . Patients’ grip strength reduced when watching someone else 
grip at a lower strength (patients with more positive symptoms showed the greatest effect), whereas HC showed 
no fluctuation in grip force. This may imply greater interference from observation of others’ actions in 
schizophrenia. Relatively few studies have explored imitation in TS. One study reported that in addition to 
echophenomena, these patients exhibit a tendency to mirror the movements of others when observed under 
experimental conditions (Finis et al., 2012). The findings of another study in TS show some similarity to those 
reported for patients with schizophrenia (especially positive symptoms) above. Jonas et al. (2010) compared 
patients with TS and HC when making finger movements while observing compatible (same) and incompatible 
(different) finger movements made by an actor. Patients performed similarly to HC for compatible movement 
observation, but showed greater interference than HC when viewing incompatible finger movements. 
2.1.2. Empathy and emotion recognition. The MNS may assist in the simulation of (and therefore 
perception of) embodied emotion (Niedenthal, 2007). Numerous studies have examined the ability of people 
with schizophrenia to recognise basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) in facial 
expressions. Deficits may be most apparent for sadness, fear (Edwards et al., 2001; Kohler et al., 2003), or 
disgust (e.g. Kohler et al., 2003). Interestingly, patients sometimes over-attribute negative emotions in response 
to neutral expressions (e.g. Kohler et al., 2003; Tsoi et al., 2008; Behere et al., 2011). Other studies suggest that 
paranoid patients exhibit better emotion recognition than patients with other forms of schizophrenia (Phillips et 
al., 1999). In relation to TS, a small study of five adult patients (Devinsky et al., 1993) reported intact or 
enhanced ability when exploring recognition of emotion from voice, face or body. Two other studies (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997) found no facial emotion recognition deficit in adults with TS. 
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However, the latter study found that those patients showing evidence of OCD (with or without TS) exhibited 
poor recognition of disgust and anger. A more recent study (Drury et al., 2012) also found little evidence for any 
impairment in basic emotion recognition from facial expressions in children and adults with TS. 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET: Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a task of facial 
expression recognition requiring the attribution of complex neutral (e.g. interested), positive (e.g. playful) and 
negative (e.g. upset) mental states. Studies have used this task in schizophrenia and reported deficits (Lam et al., 
2014; Lugnegård et al., 2013) or no impairment in comparison to HC (e.g. Wischniewski and Brüne 2011; 
Scherzer et al., 2012). Performance has been linked to symptom severity (e.g. Rominger et al., 2016) and 
constricted affect (Irani et al., 2006). Deficits can include errors for neutral expressions (Prevost et al., 2015), as 
can be seen in young people at high risk for psychosis (Zhang et al., 2016). In TS, Eddy et al. (2011a) reported a 
mild deficit on the RMET when comparing adult patients  to HC, but other studies reported no significant 
behavioral deficit (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Eddy et al., 2017).  
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) assesses self-reported empathy and contains four 
subscales, assessing fantasy (imagination and self-projection), empathic concern (appreciating others’ emotional 
state), personal distress (PD: experiencing negative emotion when observing other people’s  distress) and 
perspective taking (PT: tendencies to put oneself in someone else’s ‘shoes’). Therefore PD may involve 
mirroring processes than enable emotion contagion, whereas PT may require mentalizing. Patients with 
schizophrenia exhibit significantly higher scores than HC on the PD subscale (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2014; 
Wojakiewicz et al., 2013; Martins et al., 2011; Sparks et al., 2010) and sometimes lower PT scores (Montag et 
al., 2007). Those with first-episode psychosis (Kosaka et al., 2002) exhibit lower PT versus HC, and a trend for 
higher PD, and high social anxiety. Lehmann et al. (2014) found that high PD was linked to patients  reporting 
more contagion of negative emotions. In HC, high empathy was associated with good emotion control. 
However, high empathy in patients was not related to emotion regulation capacity. Using the Questionnaire of 
Cognitive and Affective Empathy (Reniers et al., 2011), which contains some items adapted from the IRI, Holt 
et al. (2015) found decreased cognitive empathy (e.g. PT) alongside increased affective empathy (e.g. emotion 
contagion) in schizophrenia. In relation to the TS literature, one study using the IRI found that adults with TS 
reported increased PD and decreased PT when compared to HC (Eddy et al., 2015). This is a very similar 
pattern to that seen in schizophrenia. 
A number of studies have reported impaired recognition of emotion as expressed through vocal 
prosody in schizophrenia (e.g. Hoekert et al., 2007), with poor recognition of negative emotions and sarcasm 
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(Sparks et al., 2010; Cassetta and Goghari, 2014). However, deficits in auditory sarcasm recognition can 
correlate with pitch perception deficits  implying impaired auditory processing (Kantrowitz et al., 2014). In 
relation to TS, Drury et al. (2012) investigated recognition of happy, sad, angry or frightened vocal tone and 
found that adults with TS alone were only impaired at recognising angry tone when the semantic content of the 
vocalisation was conflicting (i.e. contained pleasant content). Further research in this area is warranted. 
2.1.3. Understanding beliefs and intentions. The faux pas task (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 
2002), contains stories featuring remarks which may cause unintended offence to a character, and control stories 
with no faux pas. Participants are required to recognise whether faux pas is present, the potential negative 
impact, and its unintentional nature. Studies have reported deficits in recognising and understanding faux pas in 
paranoid schizophrenia (Lam et al., 2014; Scherzer et al., 2015), and sometimes despite intact performance on 
control questions (Ho et al., 2015).  Shur et al. (2008) found a specific deficit whereby faux pas remarks were 
interpreted as intentional. In TS, Eddy et al (2010a; 2011a) and Channon et al. (2012) reported errors on the 
faux pas task including indications of faux pas where this  was not present and under-recognition of socially 
inappropriate remarks. Sometimes patients concluded faux pas remarks were intentional, as reported by Shur et 
al. (2008) in schizophrenia.  
Understanding humour frequently requires mentalizing. Corcoran et al. (1997) compared the ability of 
patients with schizophrenia and HC to understand humorous cartoons involving mentalizing or physical humour 
(‘slap-stick’). Overall, patients with schizophrenia were more impaired at understanding mentalizing jokes, with 
paranoid patients and patients with passivity exhibiting the mildest deficit. In a later study involving cartoon 
jokes (Langdon et al., 2010), patients with schizophrenia again showed a deficit in understanding jokes 
involving theory of mind, but not slap-stick style humour. However, a few studies have reported a more 
generalised deficit (e.g. Marjoram et al., 2005). In one study that explored the understanding of humorous 
cartoons in TS (Eddy et al., 2011a), patients and HC exhibited no difference for slap-stick jokes, but adults with 
TS were more likely to misunderstand ironic and sarcastic jokes and to adopt a literal interpretation. This could 
reflect problems understanding the communicative intentions of the cartoonist.  
A number of studies have assessed the understanding of beliefs in schizophrenia, on tasks including 
false-belief tasks (which require participants to understand that they know something that the story character 
does not), and the Strange Stories  task (Happé, 1994) which requires understanding of beliefs and deception. 
Pickup and Frith (2001) explored responses to first-order (he thinks) and second-order (he thinks that she thinks) 
tests of mentalizing. Most patients with schizophrenia (particularly those with negative behavioral signs such as 
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e.g. blunt affect, social withdrawal, poverty of speech) exhibited a deficit on only the second-order task. 
However, deficits may be seen on both first and second-order belief tasks (Mazza et al., 2008), on pragmatic 
language tasks (Langdon et al., 2002; Mazza et al., 2008) including the Hinting Task (devised by Corcoran et 
al., 1995; see Scherzer et al., 2015), and the Strange Stories task (Langdon and Ward, 2010); although 
impairments may be seen on questions assessing the understanding of physical states in addition to mental states  
(Scherzer et al., 2015). One study investigating the understanding of written non-literal language in adults with 
TS reported unconventional interpretations of sarcastic and metaphorical remarks, including literal 
interpretations (Eddy et al., 2010b). However, the same study reported no deficit on the Hinting Task. An early 
study in TS (Channon et al., 2004) reported no impairment on the Strange Stories . Subsequent studies assessing 
the understanding of false-belief (Eddy et al., 2010a; Eddy et al., 2016) also reported no significant deficit in 
adults with TS (Eddy et al., 2016). 
The Frith-Happé Animations Task (AT: Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000) requires viewers to 
watch short video-clips and describe the movements of two triangles, which can be either random (e.g. drifting), 
or depict simple (e.g. dancing) or complex (e.g. coaxing) interactions. Schizophrenia can be associated with a 
reduced tendency to attribute intentions when social interactions are depicted (Horan et al., 2009; Lugnegård et 
al., 2013; Ventura et al., 2015). Russell et al. (2006) reported that patients with paranoia and behavioral signs 
exhibited worse performance than HC on the AT, and groups with passivity delusion or remitted symptoms. 
This included a trend for longer explanations on random animations, perhaps  linked to over-attributing mental 
states. Schizotypal individuals can also show an increased tendency to attribute mental states during the random 
movement condition (Fyfe et al., 2008). More recently, Eddy and Cavanna (2015) revealed that adults with TS 
were more likely than HC to describe social interactions and use mental state references when viewing random 
movement during the AT. These findings appear similar to those reported by Russel et al., in patients with 
paranoia, and could be indicative of hyper-mentalizing. 
Tasks involving gaze cues include the Yoni cartoon task (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007), 
which requires the use of gaze direction to determine what the central character is thinking about or likes. Ho et 
al. (2015) found intact performance on this task in first episode schizophrenia on first-order trials, but significant 
deficits on second-order mentalizing questions. Another study (Zhang et al., 2016) found that the performance 
of patients with schizophrenia on this task was related to clinical insight (i.e. awareness of needing treatment). 
Eddy et al. (2011a) assessed the performance of adults with TS on a similar task (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) 
that involved understanding of socially competitive emotions. The task was to use simple facial cues (eye gaze 
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direction and mouth expression) to select a target that the central character was either envious of (target happy, 
character sad), or gloating about (target sad, character happy). Control participants scored at ceiling on the task, 
and adults with TS made significantly more errors, perhaps suggesting difficulties in dealing with two perceived 
conflicting emotions because of mirroring related interference. 
Finally, given that fewer studies are available in TS than schizophrenia, it is worth mentioning a couple 
of other studies that did include social measures although they did not specifically aim to study social cognition. 
These studies (McGuire et al., 2013; Güler et al., 2015)  found that the parents of young people with tic 
disorders reported increased evidence of social problems on a scale that can indicate the presence of behaviours 
associated with autistic spectrum disorder (e.g. aspects of social interaction, signs of obsessionality and 
inflexibility). However, both studies seemed to suggest that it was those individuals with tics plus obsessive 
compulsive or attention deficit features who showed the greatest differences to HC on the scale. 
2.1.4. Summary of behavioral findings. Social cognitive deficits are usually more obvious in 
schizophrenia than in TS. For example, some patients with psychosis can demonstrate difficulty with 
recognising basic facial expressions whereas people with TS do not. However, social cognition has been much 
less explored in TS. Importantly, the specific symptom profile of schizophrenia is linked to task performance, 
such that patients with more negative symptoms demonstrate more robust evidence of deficits in social 
cognition. Patients with more positive symptoms show more subtle differences to HC such as seeing negative 
emotions under neutral conditions. Based on the data currently available, adults with TS (including those 
without comorbid obsessive compulsive or attention deficit disorders) exhibit only selective abnormalities on 
social cognitive tasks, and therefore appear more similar to patients with paranoia (or those with more positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia), rather than other presentations. Difficulties comprise understanding intentionality 
in the context of faux pas and sarcasm, and traits that may reflect greater mirroring than HC. In most cases it 
seems that people with TS and schizophrenia can experience motor interference when observing others’ actions, 
and it is possible that studies reporting reduced imitation or mentalizing deficits  have not controlled for factors 
such as general cognitive impairment, inattention or social anxiety. The following section explores neural 
abnormalities during social cognitive tasks in schizophrenia and TS. 
2.2. Neurophysiological and neuroimaging findings during tests of social cognition 
Quite a few studies have explored the neural correlates of tasks involving biological motion and 
imitation in schizophrenia, but the neural correlates of imitation have yet to be investigated in TS. Previous 
research has employed brain imaging methods during tests of facial emotion processing in schizophrenia and 
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TS. A few other studies have looked at brain activity while reasoning about intentions and false-belief, covered 
last in this section. Additional papers to those presented in the previous section were identified through searches 
of Web of Science and PubMed (06/2016 – 12/2016) using the search terms emotion; social cognition; theory of 
mind; mentalizing; or mirror neuron; plus at least one of Tourette; schizophrenia; psychosis; plus neuroimaging 
or MRI. Given that there is a focus on social cognitive tasks, most studies discussed here report fMRI findings. 
Key findings are summarized in Table 1. 
2.2.1. Imitation and motor resonance. A number of studies have reported reduced activation in motor 
areas that may form part of the MNS (e.g. premotor area) during action observation, when comparing patients 
with schizophrenia to HC (e.g. Enticott et al., 2008; Mehta et al., 2014a). A review of MNS function in 
schizophrenia (Mehta et al., 2014b) concluded that most studies interpreted their results as indicative of reduced 
MNS activity, in association with greater negative symptoms and deficits  on social cognitive tasks . However, 
some studies suggest increased MNS activity. These include studies that have used EEG to investigate mu wave 
suppression. Essentially, higher mu wave suppression over MNS areas would be indicative of greater activation. 
This occurs in HC to a certain degree during action observation, and most strongly during action imitation. 
McCormick et al. (2012) investigated mu suppression in actively psychotic patients and those with residual 
symptoms versus HC. All participants observed hand movements made by others, and this condition was 
compared to self-hand movement. More mu suppression (i.e. approx. 20% more MNS activity) was observed 
over left sensorimotor cortex in actively psychotic patients watching hand movements in comparison to the 
other two groups.  
Thakkar et al., (2014) showed patients with schizophrenia and HC videos of a moving hand pressing a 
button, a static photo, or a symbolic representation, and they were instructed to observe or execute the depicted 
button press. When comparing imitative (after viewing the moving hand) to non-imitative action (only 
static/symbolic representations), HC showed more activation in the MNS (inferior parietal lobe, posterior 
superior temporal sulcus and IFG). Group comparisons indicated less activity in patients than HC in the 
posterior STS for imitative actions, but greater activation in the right inferior parietal cortex and po sterior STS 
for non-imitative action. The authors conclude that there is  a less differentiated response for imitative action 
versus non-imitative action in schizophrenia. This could imply that patients are less able to distinguish between 
actions linked to others and those generated by oneself.  
Explanations for reduced MNS activity include reduced attention, reduced neural integrity, or factors 
related to baseline comparisons. Kato et al. (2011) used magnetoencephalography to compare unmedicated 
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patients (mainly paranoid) to HC, while observing jaw movements. Right inferior parietal cortex activity was 
less specialized in patients, showing greater activity during the control condition. Reduced activation of the 
MNS system in response to task cues may therefore reflect higher activation compared to HC at baseline. 
Studies exploring the neural correlates of imitation in TS are lacking. However, a few studies discussed later in 
this section (Eddy et al., 2016; Eddy, Cavanna and Hansen, 2017) have suggested their findings implicate 
abnormal neural activity within brain areas associated with the MNS (e.g. inferior parietal area/TPJ; inferior 
frontal gyrus), when adults with TS complete tests of social cognition. 
2.2.2. Empathy and emotion recognition. There is mixed evidence for amygdala hyper- and hypo-
activation in schizophrenia during emotion recognition. For example, there can be a reduced amygdala response 
in patients with paranoia, but an increased response to fearful expressions in patients with flat affect (e.g. Gur et 
al., 2007). Rasetti et al. (2009) found a deficit in amygdala reactivity to negative faces in schizophrenia, and an 
alteration in functional connectivity between the amygdala and the subgenual cingulate. However, many studies 
report elevated amygdala activity in these patients in response to neutral or positive expressions. (e.g. Holt et al., 
2006; Kosaka et al., 2002; Surguladze et al., 2006; Mier et al., 2010). The amygdala has also been highlighted in 
TS studies. Neuner et al., (2010) revealed increased amygdala response in TS to fearful, angry and neutral 
expressions during judgment of gender. More recently, Eddy et al. (2017) compared the brain activity of adults 
with TS and HC during mental state judgment versus when making age judgments about the same RMET 
stimuli. Areas including right amygdala were more active in TS. When patients with schizophrenia undertook a 
modified version of the RMET, they exhibited greater activity than HC in superior frontal gyrus, superior 
parietal lobe and left medial prefrontal cortex (de Achával et al., 2012).  
 Other brain areas exhibiting differential activity in schizophrenia during emotion expression processing 
are the right TPJ and IFG. Quintana et al. (2001) report right IFG hypo-function during facial emotion matching, 
and Smith et al. (2015) found both right-side TPJ and IFG hypo-function in schizophrenia during an empathy 
task which required selection of a basic emotional expression for a character based on a visual scenario. De 
Achaval et al. (2012) reported reduced activity in the right IFG and TPJ in schizophrenia during face processing, 
although this was in the context of greater overall brain activity than HC in areas including left superior 
temporal and middle temporal gyrus, left parietal lobe, left medial frontal gyrus  and right insula. Such findings 
could imply increased engagement of MNS areas, coupled with decreased activity in right TPJ and right IFG. 
These latter two areas may underpin self-other distinctions (see Eddy, 2016) and control reactions to emotional 
stimuli (Brown et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2008), respectively. In TS, one recent study (Eddy et al., 2017) using 
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the RMET (mental state versus age judgments) reported abnormal right-side TPJ and IFG activity. For HC, right 
IFG activity was greater for mental state judgment than age judgment, but in TS, the inverse pattern was found. 
This could suggest that emotion recognition is associated with right IFG hypo-function in TS.  
The aforementioned findings are also interesting to consider in relation to the observed opposing 
relationships between right IFG activity and empathy measures  reported in schizophrenia. Horan et al. (2014) 
used IRI scores as a covariate when scanning patients with schizophrenia and HC using fMRI during imitation, 
execution and observation of both finger movements and facial expressions. Patients exhibited lower PT and 
empathic concern scores, and a trend towards higher PD. Higher total IRI scores were associated with greater 
right IFG activity in HC during the observation of emotional facial expressions. However, higher IRI scores 
were related to lower right IFG activation in patients during this condition. A later study (Horan et al., 2014) 
supported this finding of contrasting relationships between empathy scores and IFG activity in schizop hrenia 
patients versus HC, although in this study a composite score for the IRI was used.  
Overall these findings suggest that in patients with schizophrenia, the amygdala responds to neutral and 
perhaps positive emotional expressions as if they have negative emotional connotations. There is also evidence 
for amygdala dysfunction during emotion recognition in TS. In addition, both TS and schizophrenia exhibit 
atypical patterns of right IFG activity during facial emotion recognition tasks . 
2.2.3. Understanding beliefs and intentions. A couple of studies have shown greater activity in the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) in patients with schizophrenia versus HC when inferring a story character’s 
intentions from cartoon stimuli (Benedetti et al., 2009; Brüne et al., 2008), and that higher n eural activations can 
be inversely correlated with behavioral performance. When using the AT and comparing social interaction 
versus random movement, Pedersen et al. (2012) found stronger activity in areas including right IFG and left 
STS, despite lower behavioral ratings for intentionality in patients than HC. Das et al. (2012) reported less 
activity in bilateral IFG and right TPJ in patients versus HC for mentalizing AT videoclips minus random 
movement. This task is yet to be combined with neuroimaging in TS. 
Other studies have reported hypo-activation of the TPJ in schizophrenia or TS during mentalizing 
tasks. Walter et al. (2009) reported this in schizophrenia during a task when there was a need to differentiate 
between the intentions of characters. However, increased medial prefrontal activity in paranoid subjects during 
the control condition involving natural physical causality suggested less of a neural distinction in patients than 
HC when processing causality related to natural processes (e.g. gravity) versus human actions. Notably, a recent 
study in TS (Eddy et al., 2016) revealed hypo-activation in brain regions including right TPJ during a 
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mentalizing task, reflecting less activation difference in patients when reasoning about natural versus human 
causality. Studies exploring the neural correlates of false-belief have also revealed cortical hypo-function in 
these patient groups. Dodell-Feder et al. (2015) showed that medial prefrontal activity was reduced during false-
belief reasoning in schizophrenia patients with high social anhedonia. Another study in schizophrenia (Lee et 
al., 2011) used fMRI during a false-belief story task (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), which allows brain activity 
during the processing of mental (false-belief) and physical (false-photo) states to be compared. This contrast 
showed fewer differences in patients with schizophrenia than HC (i.e. not including medial prefrontal cortex or 
TPJ). The same task was used by a recent study in TS (Eddy et al., 2016). Contrasting conditions revealed 
similar findings: less activity difference for false-belief in brain regions including right TPJ. 
2.2.4. Summary of neurophysiological and neuroimaging findings. Social cognitive tasks may 
activate both mirroring and mentalizing networks, leading to complementary information (Spunt and 
Lieberman, 2012a). However, these systems may be competitive, given that there is anti-correlated activity in 
these networks in healthy individuals at rest (Fox et al., 2005). Individuals with deficits in social cognition could 
be hypothesised to have difficulties in engaging one of these systems, or problems in switching between them. 
One general pattern which may be starting to emerge in schizophrenia and TS is excessive brain activity in areas 
linked to mirroring, and contrasting hypo-activation in regions thought to underpin mentalizing in response to 
social cognitive tasks. For example, the findings of McCormick et al. and Thakkar et al. could imply greater 
motor and/or emotional resonance with others in schizophrenia (especially in association with positive 
symptoms), and studies reporting hypo-function may have failed to account for greater activation within MNS 
areas during baseline or control conditions. There are also hints of increased activity in limbic and MNS regions 
in response to facial expression tasks in TS. In particular, amygdala activity can be elevated during facial 
expression tasks in both patient groups. Other regions of interest associated with abnormal function in 
schizophrenia and TS are the right IFG and right TPJ. The possible relationships between these findings and 
patients’ behavioral symptoms are explored next. 
3. The potential role of social cognition in patients’ symptoms  
Patients with schizophrenia or TS can exhibit abnormal performance on some social cognitive tasks  
which in some cases may be indicative of increased internal simulation of others’ actions or emotions , or poor 
control over MNS activity. On other occasions errors  may reflect an over-application or an under-application of 
mentalizing. This section will discuss how problems with self-other distinction in schizophrenia and TS may 
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contribute to symptoms involving emotional dysregulat ion, paranoia, SA and harmful or socially disruptive 
behaviors (Table 2). 
3.1. Self-other distinction and emotional dysregulation 
At times, effective social cognition requires one to mirror, or simulate, the physical or mental state of 
another person. For example, empathy may be achieved when the observer activates similar neural circuitry to 
the feeler, gaining a sense of the emotion. However, this mirroring process must be controlled to ensure that a 
distinction between the self and other is maintained, especially when conflicting mental states must be 
appreciated at the same time (e.g. during false-belief tasks). Problems with self-other distinctions could lead one 
to be confused about the origin of a simulated action or emotion. Previous studies suggest that in schizophrenia, 
and perhaps to a lesser extent in TS, brain areas involved in simulation of others’ actions and emotions are 
readily activated, and there may be poorer control over mirroring processes  than in typically developing 
individuals. Confusing the actions of self and others could contribute to symptoms such as echophenomena, 
while difficulties distinguishing the self from other people experiencing or expressing emotions could contribute 
to emotional dysregulation. 
In social settings, patients with schizophrenia can be overly sensitive and more reactive to the feelings 
of other people when compared to HC (Michaels et al., 2014). Dysfunctional emotion regulation (Van der Velde 
et al., 2015), excessive awareness of others’ feelings (Masillo et al., 2012) and a hyper-empathising profile 
(Brosnan et al., 2010) can be associated with psychosis. Enhanced empathy could also help to explain why some 
patients with schizophrenia attribute mental states better to others than to themselves (Langdon et al., 1997), or 
find it easier to reason about their own mental states when taking the perspective of another (Gambini et al., 
2004). In relation to TS, while one study reported no difference between patients with TS and HC in terms of 
interpersonal reactivity (Eddy et al., 2015), preliminary evidence suggests that individuals with TS who exhibit 
echophenomena demonstrate increased empathy (and grey matter differences within the MNS) when compared 
to patients who don’t report echophenomena (Harrison et al., 2007).    
Increased tendencies towards mirroring others  could explain high ratings of PD on the IRI in 
schizophrenia and TS (Table 1). That is, mirroring another person’s  negative emotion could induce negative 
emotion in oneself, and a faulty internal attribution could heighten this experience. Longer term consequences 
could include distress and reduced sense of control over one’s own emotions . Emotional dysregulation and 
associated negative feelings could become intrinsically bound to social cognitive processes within the 
individual, leading to confusion and unpleasant experiences during social interaction. The right TPJ is part of 
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the mentalizing network and has been specifically suggested to underpin self-other distinctions (Sowden and 
Shah, 2014). Hypo-activation of this region could therefore explain reports of reduced PT in schizophrenia (e.g. 
Montag et al., 2007) and TS (e.g. Eddy et al., 2015), and problems with self-other distinctions reflected in high 
PD. However, control over mirroring processes  or simulated actions and emotions  could also involve the right 
IFG, an area associated with control of action and related emotional respons es (Brown et al., 2012; Kringelbach 
and Rolls, 2003). For example, in healthy subjects completing an emotion labelling task, increased activity in 
right IFG is coupled with reduced amygdala activity, implying prefrontal control over emotional responses 
(Hariri et al., 2000). Previous studies indicate both schizophrenia and TS have can be linked to excessive 
amygdala activity while viewing of emotional facial expressions. Poorly controlled amygdala activations could 
lead to conditioned aversive response, in addition to abnormal performance on social cognitive tasks. 
The phenomenological experience of schizophrenia highlights a role for negative affect in association 
with reduced self-other distinction. Henriksen et al. (2012) describes self-disorders in schizophrenia; a sense of 
diminished identity and first-person perspective. One illustrative case felt upset by people as they would come to 
close to her; claimed to have no idea who she was; felt like others could see her thoughts; and suffered with 
social anxiety and SA. Poor self-other boundaries have also been reported in children with a genetic high risk to 
schizophrenia (Brent et al., 2014). While such severe self-disorders have not been described in TS, these 
patients do exhibit evidence of increased sensitivity to the actions and emotions of others. In addition to 
echophenomena, TS can feature ironic or egodystonic socially inappropriate urges, whereby the patient easily 
identifies remarks or actions that would upset others, but denies intent to hurt or offend, finding such thoughts 
and urges distressing (e.g. Eddy & Cavanna, 2013). Perhaps acting out socially inappropriate behaviors 
emphasize conflict between the self and the other, which may counteract the uncomfortable emotional or 
psychological effects of over-blending (Eddy, 2016).  
3.2. Mirroring, mentalizing and paranoia 
Paranoid patients feel that other people’s  intentions are negative, reflecting a tendency towards 
attribution of intention, and a negative emotional bias. Potential routes towards attributing intention include 
mirroring processes (i.e. MNS) or cognitive reasoning (mentalizing). Studies in monkeys have shown that they 
can understand what the end result of an action will be when this is obscured from view (Ulmità et al., 2001), 
suggesting that the mirroring mechanism allows for predictions about action effects and therefore a form of 
intention attribution. However, because intentions are derived from the observed action or its closely related 
consequence, intention and action must match, thus backward inference implies outcomes are intended. 
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Alternative means of attributing intention could involve mentalizing about a person’s beliefs or desires. Such 
reasoning can allow for greater flexibility, and the incorporation of knowledge e.g. about a person’s traits or past 
behaviors, allowing for an actor’s  intention to be different to the consequence of their action. Interestingly, very 
young children (who may have an operational MNS but not fully developed mentalizing abilities) tend to make 
attributions about intentions based predominantly on the consequences of actions  (e.g. Zelazo et al., 1996). 
When adults successfully integrate information about beliefs into their moral judgments about people’s actions,  
activity is seen in metalizing areas such as TPJ and precuneus (Young and Saxe, 2008). 
Greater reliance on mirroring than mentalizing during social situations could lead one to assume that 
actions and their consequences are synonymous with the actor’s intentions , such that negative consequences 
imply negative intentions. That is, these patients could show an inflated ‘intentionality bias’ (Rosset, 2008), and 
paranoid interpretations of the motives underlying observed behavior. Although such effects have only been 
explored directly in schizophrenia (Peyroux et al., 2014), both patients with TS and schizophrenia can show a 
greater tendency than typically developing HC to assume intention based on consequence, as demonstrated by 
responses to the faux pas task, where frequent identification of an offensive remark is frequently followed by the 
assumption that offence was intended (Table 1). Such tendencies may have additional implications in relation to 
judgments of blame and morality. Future research should investigate relationships between the valence of 
attributed intentions and observed action consequences in these patient populations . 
A tendency to attribute intentions, internal negative affect, and poor self-other distinctions could 
underlie delusions of persecution. Low self-esteem and negative self-schemas are common in patients with 
persecutory delusions (Kesting et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2014) and self-blame predicts long term paranoia 
(Westermann et al., 2013). If self-other boundaries are unclear, we may mistakenly attribute the origin of our 
negative emotion and project onto others, feeling their emotions (and intentions) towards us  are negative. 
Emotional dysregulation, and sensing a lack of control over our emotions may fuel a sense of being manipulated 
or controlled by others. In sum, impaired self-other distinctions could lead to not only taking on another’s 
emotion, but also misattributing our own mental state to another person. Behavioral features associated with this 
latter problem could also include thought insertion, and egocentric errors on social cognitive tasks , helping to 
explain inconsistent social cognitive performance across studies. Future research could explore whether possible 
markers of excessive mirroring (e.g. echophenomena) are associated with emotional dysregulation and paranoia. 
Feelings of harm in association with relating to other people’s mental states could be coupled with a 
conditioned neural response. For example, excessive amygdala or orbitofrontal activity seen in patients with 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
schizophrenia and TS during social cognitive tasks  (Table 1) could reflect negative reinforcement given the 
involvement of these brain regions in emotion related learning (e.g. O’Doherty et al., 2001). Green et al. (2004) 
report that patients with schizophrenia exhibit a greater automatic pre-attentive response to threatening stimuli, 
but may then apply attention avoiding strategies (e.g. fewer fixations on angry facial stimuli), reducing the 
chance for reappraisal. Patients’ attempts to rationalize the unpleasant emotional experiences they have in 
response to social interaction with others may lead them to conclude that the cause is external: others intend to 
do them harm. In summary, the reported association between unstable self-concept and paranoia (Tiernan et al., 
2014), probably reflects a combination of increased intention attribution, negative affect and impaired self-other 
distinctions. 
3.3. Self-other distinction, social anhedonia and hypo-mentalizing 
Numerous studies have reported high levels of social anhedonia (SA) in patients with schizophrenia. 
For example, Blanchard et al. (1998) found that SA in these patients was associated with increased s ocial 
anxiety. In healthy populations, high SA can be associated with schizotypal personality traits (Rey et al., 2009), 
paranoia during every-day social interactions (Hooker et al., 2014), and poorer inhibitory control over 
emotionally salient stimuli (Martin et al., 2012). Therefore increased PD and distressing experiences linked to 
impaired self-other distinctions, could reduce reward from social interaction. Interestingly, patients with 
schizophrenia may show blunted affect at the same time as reporting normal intensity of emotional experience. 
For example, in one study using International Affective Picture System images, 40% of patients with 
schizophrenia patients found the negative stimuli more negative and arousing than the control group, despite 
experiencing higher levels of SA (Strauss and Herbener, 2011). Social sensitivity could therefore contribute to 
negative symptoms such as SA which appear paradoxically like social disinterest or insensitivity. 
People with SA may perceive the stressors they face as particularly uncontrollable or overwhelming 
(Horan et al. 2007). Indeed, excessive mirroring and related emotion contagion could lead social situations to 
become aversive. The emotional overarousal experienced by patients with schizophrenia when in the company 
of others may lead to extreme regulatory strategies (Harder and Lysaker, 2013) in addition to avoidant coping, 
anxiety, depression and social withdrawal (Masillo et al., 2012). Signs of social withdrawal could therefore 
reflect negative symptoms, or coping strategies linked to positive symptoms. This may explain why ratings on 
empathy measures do not always correlate with social behaviors as expected. Haker and Rössler (2009) found a 
positive association between higher PD scores and greater evidence of negative symptoms. Alexithymia in 
schizophrenia (e.g. Fogley et al., 2014) could be related to a similar kind of emotional ‘burnout’. In sum, some 
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aspects of social dysfunction in schizophrenia could result from excessive negative affect in response to social 
stimuli rather than a lack of social cognitive ability per se. 
 Interestingly, SA may be associated with abnormalities in brain areas underlying mirroring and 
mentalizing. For example, studies have revealed correlations between SA score and cortical thickness in areas 
including the IFG, postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal cortex (Wang et al., 2014). Yin et 
al. (2015) showed that when compared to schizophrenia patients with lower SA, those with high SA exhibited 
reduced functional connectivity between ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the motor cortex, inferior 
parietal cortex and posterior temporal area when viewing socially positive (versus neutral) videos of emotional 
expressions. However reduced connectivity could underpin increased SA or some kind of adaptive response. 
Another study (Germine et al., 2011) showed that patients with schizophrenia and high SA exhibited reduced 
activity in face processing areas (right fusiform gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex and right superior temporal 
gyrus) when discriminating between emotional facial expressions. Again, it is not clear whether this 
hypoactivation reflected SA, or other factors such as  attention avoidance. 
 While positive symptoms can be linked to hyper-mentalizing, negative symptoms can be linked to 
hypo-mentalizing (Montag et al., 2011). Future studies therefore need to consider where errors may reflect 
coping strategies or conditioned avoidance, in addition to neurodegeneration or executive deficits . Some 
evidence of hypo-mentalizing could reflect avoidance of social cognition; a good example being the dual report 
of high PD but low PT on the IRI, as seen in both schizophrenia and TS (Table 1). Furthermore, when 
processing facial expressions, patients with TS exhibit hypo-activation within brain mentalizing regions when 
conscious reasoning about mental states is prompted (Eddy et al., 2016), but greater activity than HC in similar 
brain regions when mentalizing is not required by the task (Eddy et al., 2017). Poor control over some aspects of 
social cognition (i.e. automatic mirroring), may lead to conscious or subconscious attempts to reduce or control 
other aspects of social cognition (i.e. mentalizing). 
3.4. Sense of agency and impulsive socially disruptive behaviors 
One possible consequence of impaired self-other distinction may be problems determining agency, due 
to a weakened sense of internal control over one’s own thoughts, actions and their consequences . It has been 
shown that an external locus of control in childhood predicts later paranoia (e.g. Thompson et al., 2011) and 
altered sense of agency may be a risk factor for the development of psychosis (Hauser et al., 2011). Moritz et al. 
(2007) compared attribution style in schizophrenia, anxiety, depression and HC. When judging whether negative 
events were due to people or the situation, paranoid patients were less likely than HC to rate themselves as the 
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cause. This could imply decreased internal locus of control and the potential for delusions of control. For a more 
in depth discussion of sense of agency in schizophrenia, the reader is referred to Nelson et al. (2014). The 
possibility of atypical sense of agency may in TS is yet to be explored. 
Altered sense of agency may be associated with an increased propensity towards impulsive behavior, 
given that it may be more difficult to learn associations between one’s own willed actions and their 
consequences. A range of impulsive and risky or dysfunctional behaviors are common to both TS (Kurlan et al., 
1996; Eddy and Cavanna, 2013a; Wright et al., 2012; Frank et al., 2011; Mathews et al., 2004) and 
schizophrenia (Hirjak et al., 2013; Desai and Potenza, 2009; Pluck et al., 2013; Hoptman, 2015; Tracy et al., 
1996), including self-harm, explosive disorder, antisocial behavior and impulse control disorders (e.g. gambling, 
hypersexuality etc.). More specific effects may involve sensory symptoms and related motor behavior. For 
example, tics are viewed as semi-voluntary or involuntary by patients. However, it is worth further considering 
the potential role of MNS dysfunction in patients’ symptoms. Action representations are thought to be 
subconsciously activated by observation of another’s action (Jeannerod, 1999). In TS, the experience of frequent 
mirroring of others may lead the motor system to feel less under internal control, resulting in reduced sense of 
agency. A conditioned loss of control over the motor system could contribute to involuntary movements (which 
have also been observed in drug-naïve schizophrenia e.g. Peralta et al., 2010). Alternatively, if the motor system 
is readily ‘hi-jacked’ by external stimuli, having tics could help bring the system under internal control 
(allowing self-other distinction), and this  could develop into a conditioned response.  
Perhaps both TS and schizophrenia feature certain compulsive behavioral problems that serve to 
emphasize self-other differences and enhance sense of agency. One good example of this may be the 
phenomenon of impulsive non-conformity, as described in schizophrenia. Chapman et al. (1984) constructed the 
Impulsive Nonconformity Scale to measure ‘impulsive antisocial behavior’ which may indicate a risk factor for 
psychosis. Patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder scored higher on the scale than HC, and 
controls with high scores reported more psychotic or psychotic-like experiences. In another study involving a 
normative population (Aldebot Sacks et al., 2012), increased self-certainty was associated with greater 
impulsive nonconformity. Therefore impulsive nonconformity could in some way be protective to the self-
concept and sense of agency, perhaps by highlighting self-other boundaries more clearly. 
Impulsive nonconformity may lead to signs of inflexibility, challenging or anti-social behavior, or 
ironic acts that resemble the socially inappropriate urges seen in TS. They could also include self-injurious 
behaviors. When self-other boundaries are confused, impulsive non-conformity could occur against the will of 
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the self in addition to the will of others. This would help to explain egodystonic intrusive thoughts of harming 
the self or others. In schizophrenia, dystonic command hallucinations can include voices telling the patient to 
e.g. drink bleach; smash things in the house; shout or swear at other people; jump in front of cars; be violent 
towards others (Birchwood et al., 2014). Sometimes the instructions are insignificant (e.g. make a facial 
grimace) but sometimes they are serious violent actions (Hersh and Borum, 1998). While descriptions of tics 
have referred to ‘strict internal commands’ (Hollenbeck, 2001), only very rarely have auditory hallucinations 
been reported in TS (e.g. Kerbeshian and Burd, 1985). Rather than hearing voices, patients report sensory or 
psychological urges to carry out similar harmful actions, including self-injurious or dangerous behaviors (e.g. 
touching a hot iron: Leckman, 2003; Cheung et al., 2007) and socially inappropriate actions  (e.g. to insult or 
physically harm others: Kurlan et al., 1996; Eddy and Cavanna, 2013a). Socially inappropriate urges in TS 
create direct conflict based on the intentions and desires of the self and the other. The ironic nature of these 
urges is emphasized by their association with an awareness of other people’s mental states , and a sensitivity to 
others’ negative emotions. Based on the action-goal implications of the MNS, acting in a certain way implies a 
matching intention to perform that act. Carrying out the prohibited action therefore yields attribution of a mental 
state directly at odds with the mental state of the victim, emphasizing self-other distinction. 
In summary, socially disruptive and inappropriate symptoms  in TS and schizophrenia may reflect 
manifestations of the patient’s struggle to achieve self-other distinction, and perhaps even help to maintain sense 
of self and self-agency. While they may be partly adaptive for the self-concept, they are clearly destructive 
within society and impair the patient’s social integration. 
4. Conclusions, limitations and directions for future research 
This narrative review has discussed the evidence for deficits in social cognition in schizophrenia and 
TS, and shown that both patient groups can exhibit complex patterns of impairment across social cognitive 
tasks. There is mounting evidence for differences in the way that these patient groups respond to tasks that 
involve mirroring processes, in a way that may imply a greater tendency to engage the MNS than HC. There is 
also a tendency for some patients in these populations to over-apply mental states, particularly intentions, when 
stimuli are ambiguous or neutral; but to also exhibit evidence of hypo-mentalizing, particularly during tasks 
involving prompted mentalizing. Attributed intentions are also frequently associated with a negative affective 
interpretation. Overall, there are intriguing similarities  in relation to how both patient groups respond to tasks 
requiring mirroring versus mentalizing. The ability to distinguish mental states relating to the self and other may 
be impaired in both TS and schizophrenia, contributing to a range of symptoms, including impulsive and 
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compulsive socially disruptive behaviors. However, there are complexities in interpreting task performance and 
the basis for patients’ behavioral deficits. The limitations of reviewed studies will be discussed first, before 
more specific directions for future research to help answer these queries  are covered. Finally, the overall 
implications of the review findings  are considered. 
4.1. Limitations 
  Deficits on social cognitive tasks could reflect a range of incidental confounds. These include 
medication effects such as fatigue, and distractions due to primary symptoms associated with the disorder (i.e. 
tics or hallucinations). Symptoms such as paranoia and suspiciousness may pose additional challenges to 
assessment. Some schizophrenia samples exhibit deficits in social cognition that are no more significant than 
those found in patients with depression (e.g. Kettle et al., 2008), raising the limitation that few studies have 
included a clinical comparison group to help control for mood disorder or anxiety. In addition, while there is 
scant data in relation to the influence of dopaminergic or serotonergic agents on social cognitive tasks  in these 
patient populations, these agents could influence task performance (e.g. Savina and Beninger, 2007). Other 
mediating factors include general cognitive or neurological impairment (e.g. Wang et al., 2015; Kantrowitz et 
al., 2014). The inclusion of matched control tasks and better clinical characterisation of samples would be 
helpful. 
Problems reflecting upon and expressing emotion have been frequently highlighted in schizophrenia  
(e.g. O’Driscoll et al., 2014) and alexithymia could contribute to deficits in social cognitive tasks. The 
relationship between social cognitive performance and alexithymia requires much more thorough exploration in 
schizophrenia, TS and other disorders. However, it should be considered that (in a similar way to that proposed 
for SA) alexithymia could reflect emotional confusion as a result of poor control over mirroring and emotional 
contagion; or be a reactive mechanism to counteract emotional dysregulation, whereby the patient conditions 
themselves against focusing on emotional stimuli to counteract problems with feeling overwhelmed. Selective 
attention to social cues has been suggested to result in evidence of hypo-mentalizing (e.g. Combs et al., 2008). 
This raises the point that more generally, some of the problematic abnormal behaviors seen in psychiatric 
conditions could actually reflect coping mechanisms rather than the primary source of dysfunction. Comparing 
coherent subgroups with heterogenous patient samples (e.g. based on predominant symptoms or symptom 
severity) could be beneficial. 
The complex pattern of deficits across tasks could partly reflect inconsistencies in the level of error 
analysis undertaken. Those studies that report a breakdown or errors on control questions, or scores across 
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subscales of a measure tend to offer most insight. In addition, some discrepancies across studies could reflect 
differences in the task instructions linked to explicit versus implicit emotion processing. For example, Li et al., 
(2010) reported abnormal fusiform gyrus activity in schizophrenia only during explicit recognition of emotion 
and not for tasks involving implicit emotion processing (e.g. during age judgments). In TS, the same stimuli can 
elicit hypo- or hyper-activation in brain mentalizing areas depending on task instructions (e.g. Eddy et al., 
2017). In schizophrenia, MNS activations may also be greater during implicit processing (e.g. Quintana et al., 
2001). 
The findings of some studies on facial emotion recognition in schizophrenia add a very interesting 
caveat to this debate. Davis et al. (2000) compared paranoid patients to non-paranoid (disorganized) patients and 
HC on a task involving recognition of genuine and posed emotional facial expressions. They found that paranoid 
patients showed enhanced recognition of genuine expressions, and only performed more poorly than HC when 
expressions were posed. This study was motivated by the findings of La Russo (1973), who reported that some 
aspects of emotion recognition in paranoid patients appear to be enhanced, such that they show a  greater 
sensitivity to non-verbal cues when these are genuine. It is likely that the majority of studies considered in this 
review used actors posing expressions, raising issues around the validity of laboratory tests of social cognitive 
ability. 
One fundamental problem raised earlier in this review relates to control tasks and baselines. Sometimes 
patients with TS or schizophrenia appear to exhibit hypo-activation in contrasts when compared to HC. 
However, this could reflect abnormally high activity in the baseline condition or towards neutral stimuli used as 
control tasks. For example, Modinos et al. (2015) compared patients with first episode schizophrenia and ultra 
high-risk individuals to HC, and discovered increased brain activity in areas including the insula, amygdala and 
IFG for neutral stimuli, which likely contributed to the result of hypo-activation versus HC for emotional 
stimuli. Another problem relates to amygdala activations. This st ructure has been shown to activate abnormally 
in TS and schizophrenia in some studies, but not in others. As the amygdala rapidly habituates to stimuli (e.g. 
Phillips et al., 2001) it is possible that some studies may miss this effect. There is also the possibility that earlier 
and later amygdala activations may depend on different (i.e. cortical and subcortical) routes. This is worthy of 
exploration but has, as yet, received little attention. 
It is of course imperative for studies of social cognition to consider the possible influence of comorbid 
autistic spectrum disorder within patient populations including schizophrenia and TS (e.g. Sverd et al.,1991; 
Lugnegård et al., 2015). While some characteristics (e.g. hyper-mentalizing) may appear less likely to be 
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attributable to autism, in other cases the situation is less clear. Determination of the primary disorder responsible 
for social cognitive problems could be complicated by factors such as the varying severity of symotoms across 
the autistic spectrum, and the possibility that some behavioral difficulties may arguably constitute an integral 
part of multiple diagnostic entities. These difficulties further emphasise the potential benefits of research 
directly comparing the responses of individuals with autist ic spectrum disorders to those of patients presenting 
with social cognitive problems but diagnosed with other psychiatric disorders. 
It has been suggested that while one of the most popular concepts referred to in neuroscience, the 
mirror neuron theory is not without limitations (see Kilner and Lemon, 2013), including the tendency for studies 
to rely on fMRI data rather than direct evidence from single cell recordings from within the numerous brain 
areas now thought to form part of the MNS. Furthermore, it could be argued that motor predictive coding may 
allow for similar functions (Kilner et al., 2007). While it is currently unclear how self-other distinctions may 
relate to the MNS, one possibility is that activity within brain areas containing mirror neurons may vary in order 
to signal internally or externally generated actions, hence contributing to self-other differentiation. While it is 
currently unclear how self-other distinctions may relate to the MNS, one possibility is that activity within brain 
areas containing mirror neurons may vary in order to signal internally or externally generated actions, hence 
contributing to self-other differentiation. Alternatively, self-other distinctions could be underpinned by brain 
regions which may not necessarily contain mirror neurons (e.g. right TPJ), but which form part of a system 
involving other brain regions that do. In such a system, dysfunction within brain regions that actually perform 
the differentiation function rather than the mirroring function would likely provide a plausible explanation for 
the difficulties of patients with schizophrenia or TS, especially when these patients do not show deficits with 
abilities such as imitation, but do exhibit evidence of difficulties in disentangling men tal and physical states 
relating to the self and other. In other words, social cognitive difficulties in some disorders may not involve 
dysfunction of mirror neurons per se, but rather abnormalities within brain areas that allow one to interpret or 
control the output of mirror neurons. 
The challenges involved in this narrative review included the breadth of literature available and the 
scope of this topic. One specific problem was the current lack of studies involving children with TS, and 
research in this area will make a valuable contribution given the neurodevelopmental nature of TS and the 
possibility that adult patients may comprise a more severe subpopulation. It is also the case that the majority of 
existing research on social cognition in TS comes from the same lab, which could influence the variance across 
studies and emphasises the importance of further research of this nature. Manual search was used in order to 
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maintain focus within specific themes, and it is possible that a more refined or systematic approach may have 
reduced the potential for bias. However, the review findings inform the development of novel hypotheses based 
on existing literature. Therefore many of the suggestions raised here remain to be directly tested through 
empirical study or meta-analyses. 
4.2. Unanswered questions for future research 
Schizophrenia and TS fall across a fairly wide spectrum of severity, and it has been suggested that 
different subtypes of schizophrenia could be related to different types of social cognitive impairment i.e. 
paranoia is associated with hypermentalizing whereas patients with more negative symptoms demonstrate  
hypomentalizing (Frith, 2004). In addition, a recent study indicated that disorganized symptoms may be more 
closely linked to social cognition than other symptom clusters , including negative symptoms (Minor and 
Lysaker, 2014). Studies involving larger samples of patients more clearly characterised in terms of e.g. subtype, 
predominant symptom cluster, treatment and symptom status, will enable better exploration of relationships 
between social cognitive performance and specific symptoms. Moreover, although schizophrenia and TS can be 
considered neurodevelopmental disorders, relatively few within-participant longitudinal studies have been 
conducted. In order to understand the mechanisms driving patients’ social cognitive performance, and identify 
related clinical risk factors and prognostic markers, it is essential to study the progression of impairments within 
individuals, especially in populations with such heterogeneous symptom expression. Longitudinal studies will 
be particularly useful in determining whether social cognitive deficits are due to different underlying problems 
at different stages. For example, the findings of this review may suggest that earlier stage deficits indicate 
excessive mirroring and emotional dysregulation, while later impairments reflect conditioned aversive or 
avoidant coping responses, or in schizophrenia, the result of neurodegenerative processes. Such studies will also 
be useful in determining the causal relationship between behavioral problems, neural changes and social 
cognitive impairments. To the authors’ knowledge there are not yet any published studies exploring theory of 
mind in children with TS. Longitudinal studies involving children at risk of tics or schizophrenia (e.g. with 
symptomatic relatives) could reveal that social cognition is a risk factor for the development of these disorders. 
 Differences in application of the mirroring and mentalizing systems could explain related symptoms in 
other disorders such as OCD. Many of the negative intrusive thoughts in OCD contain similar content to themes 
apparent in command hallucinations and socially inappropriate urges . While there are many similarities in the 
symptoms of TS, schizophrenia and OCD which could reflect right TPJ dysfunction (Eddy, 2016), thought 
action fusion (TAF) may be of particular interest. This describes the tendency to believe thinking about 
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something can be causal to it happening (i.e. a thought is like an action: Salkovskis, 1985), and is thought to be 
a primary source of symptoms in OCD (see Berle and Starcevic, 2005). TAF therefore appears to involve 
perceiving an abnormally strong association between one’s internal thoughts and external actions or events. 
Perhaps people who demonstrate TAF show a tendency towards over-use of mirroring mechanisms to explain 
the reasons for actions and events, assuming the action follows an intention. Moral TAF has been described, 
which links negative thoughts (e.g. about harm occurring to someone) with negative self-attributions about 
morality. These attributions would be based on a backward inference about the imagined negative action, which 
can only be assumed to arise from negative intention. Patients with TAF may carry out compulsive actions (e.g. 
arranging objects) to reduce the likelihood that the negative event will occur. Perhaps these goal-directed action 
compulsions allow the patient to use their tendency towards TAF to construct an opposing backward inference 
model (i.e. I did this positive action therefore my intention is positive, so now no harm will occur) that reassures 
them of their intention and also their physical sense of agency? Functional connectivity studies comparing 
activation in the MNS and mentalizing networks  in individuals with TAF may prove to be informative. 
Another interesting question arises when focusing on the differences between TS and schizophrenia. 
Despite many apparent similarities in terms of social cognition and symptom profiles, people with schizophrenia 
clearly exhibit much more evident psychosis. The reasons for this  could lie in other observed differences, one of 
which is the lack of more obvious motor disorder in schizophrenia. It has been suggested that motor tics could 
be protective in terms of maintaining a sense of physical self and enhancing self-other distinction (Eddy, 2016). 
The motor system and basal ganglia in particular may have an important role to play in terms of behavioral and 
neural compensation processes . For example, the putamen is larger in boys with TS than HC (Roessner et al., 
2011), and increased putamen size in schizophrenia has been linked to symptom reduction (Buchsbaum et al., 
2003). Moreover, findings from prospective, longitudinal studies of birth cohorts have identified motor delays 
and impairments as key antecedents of schizophrenia (see Macmanus et al., 2014). The relationship between 
motor dysfunction and social cognition has been highlighted in multiple disorders including Huntington’s 
disease (e.g. Eddy et al., 2014; Eddy and Rickards, 2015), and Parkinson’s disease (e.g. Buxton et al., 2013; 
Marneweck et al., 2014). Future studies should include motor function assessments in order to explore the 
relationship between social cognition, psychosis and a range of motor signs including tics. 
 Dopamine dysfunction is an additional factor that may be linked to atypical social cognition in both TS 
and schizophrenia. This neurotransmitter is implicated in motor functions and reward related behaviors. It could 
therefore interact with emotion related learning and perhaps increase the tendency towards  activation of brain 
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motor areas. In addition to considering the impact of medications that alter dopamine, studies should consider 
the relationship between dopamine and the specific type of social cognitive problems exhibited by patients . It is 
possible that elevated dopamine may contribute to hyper-mentalizing, (see e.g. Abu-Akel and Shamay Tsoory; 
Brunet Gouet and Decety, 2006), perhaps through increasing the salience of social stimuli (Rosenfeld et al., 
2011). While high dopamine has been suggested to be linked to hyper-mentalizing in schizophrenia (Mier and 
Kirsch, 2017), TS (Eddy and Cavanna, 2015) and other disorders (e.g. Huntington’s disease: Eddy and Rickards, 
2015), perhaps reduced states of dopamine (as in e.g. Parkinson’s disease) are more likely to be linked to hypo -
mentalizing. In TS, it is known that tic severity fluctuates markedly over time, and this could be related to 
changes in tonic or phasic dopamine levels. Pharmacological challenge studies involving brain motor regions 
that may contribute to the MNS may offer insight, as would studies involving the role of dopamine in and 
reward related learning in association with social stimuli in schizophrenia and TS. 
 More broadly, this review has raised questions pertaining to the role of structures such as the TPJ and 
IFG in relation to the mirroring and mentalizing networks. The right IFG region has been implicated in the 
control of actions and emotions (Aron et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2012), reversal learning (Kringelbach and 
Rolls, 2003) and speech production (Rizzolatti et al., 2009; Molnar-szakacs et al., 2005) in addition to the MNS. 
Indeed, a meta-analysis demonstrated that in typically developing individuals, subregions of the IFG may be 
specialised for empathy, action control and language functions (Liakakis et al., 2011). A range of problems with 
social cognition, behavioral control and language functions (perhaps including inner speech) could therefore be 
related to IFG dysfunction. However, the TPJ (see Eddy, 2016) may also be relevant, given its suggested role in 
self-other differentiation for actions and emotions (right side), and language comprehension (left side). Even in 
healthy high-functioning individuals, further work is needed to establish whether mirroring and mentalizing 
processes are necessarily independent or mutually inhibitory. Variation in behavioral symptoms linked to social 
cognition across psychiatric disorders could reflect subtle differences in structural and functional connectivity or 
the automaticity and control of the neural networks underlying mirroring and mentalizing. 
4.3. Conclusions 
A review of social cognition in schizophrenia and TS highlights a range of similarities in both 
performance on social cognitive tasks and in clinical symptoms. Exploration of study findings suggests that 
processes associated with mirroring and mentalizing could be disrupted in both disorders. More specifically, 
patients within both populations can exhibit tendencies towards greater or less controlled MNS activations, and 
perhaps related under-application of mentalizing processes, leading to impaired self-other distinction. Such 
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problems could be linked to a range of behavioral symptoms, including emotional outbursts, motor signs such as 
echophenomena and perhaps even some of the more serious and socially disruptive and harmful acts tha t can 
present in these disorders. If this is the case, it may be therapeutically beneficial to attempt to correct problems 
with self-other distinctions in these patients  via for example, cognitive behavioral therapy. Alternatively, 
neurostimulation techniques could beneficially modulate activity within the MNS or mentalizing systems 
reducing symptom severity, or even the development of more serious psychosis. Such techniques are now 
beginning to be applied with a view to enhancing social cognition in schizophrenia (e.g. Rassovsky et al., 2015). 
In addition to highlighting how investigating social cognition can offer insight into the 
neuropsychological basis for patients’ symptoms and therefore guide intervention, this review has shown that 
comparing different groups of patients could help us to identify cognitive styles or attribution biases that 
constitute risk factors for the development of problem behaviors across multiple psychiatric disorders. While the 
possible use of self-other distinction as a marker will require careful operationalisation of this construct, 
identification of such markers can inform the development of useful dimensional screening measures for use in 
healthy and clinical populations .  
 Examining the differences in symptom profiles across disorders with similar neuropsychological 
deficits is also likely to provide insight into markers of resilience of potential compensation mechanisms. 
Importantly, some impairments highlighted by socio-cognitive tasks and related behavioral symptoms could 
reflect coping strategies, conditioned responses  or neural reorganisation, issues that have been frequently 
neglected in previous literature. Therefore in addition to refining our tasks and assessments, we must bear these 
possibilities in mind when interpreting identified impairments. Considering the mechanisms underlying any 
existing effective compensatory strategy used by patients could be informative in guiding therapeutic 
interventions that help maintain the stability of the self. Perhaps in time more psychiatric symptoms will be 
understood to reflect an over-compensating brain, and a somewhat ironic but inevitable product of adaption.  
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Table 1.  
Key findings on social cognitive tasks in schizophrenia and Tourette syndrome 
 
Task (section) Schizophrenia Tourette syndrome 
 
Imitation and Mirror 
Neuron System (MNS) 
tasks (2.1.1./2.2.1) 
 Reduced imitation and emotion contagion during social 
interaction and when observing others’ movements, especially if 
more negative symptoms (Kupper et al., 2015) 
 This is not linked to empathy (Haker & Rössler, 2009)  
 MNS activity less specific to imitation context and possibility of 
greater MNS activity during baseline and control tasks (e.g. 
Thakkar et al, 2014) 
 Greater MNS interference from observed movement if more 
positive symptoms (Nakagawa and Hoshiyama, 2015) 
 More interference from observed biological 
motion when producing conflicting 
movements to those observed (Jonas et al., 
2010)  
 Activity differences in brain areas associated 
with the MNS during social cognitive tasks 
(Eddy et al., 2016;2017) 
Recognition of basic 
emotional facial 
expressions 
(2.1.2./2.2.2) 
 Deficit  worst on first generation antipsychotics (Kohler et al, 
2010) 
 Tendency for paranoid to over-attribute negative emotions 
(Behere et al, 2011)   
 Deficit  for neutral expressions (e.g. Kohler et al., 2003) 
 Mixture of findings for amygdala activity, including hyper-
activation to neutral expressions (e.g. Holt et al, 2006) 
 No deficits in basic emotion recognition in 
uncomplicated TS (Drury et al., 2012)  
 possible amygdala hyper-sensitivity to these 
stimuli (Neuner et al., 2010) 
 
Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test 
(2.1.2./2.2.2.) 
 Deficits associated with social anxiety, constricted affect and lack 
of close friends (Irani et al., 2006) 
 More impaired if more severe auditory hallucinations (Rominger 
et al, 2016).  
 Errors for neutral mental states (e.g. Prevost et al, 2015). 
 Behavioural differences are mild (Eddy et al., 
2011) 
 More activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate, right temporo-parietal 
junction and right amygdala during the task 
(Eddy et al., 2017) 
Empathy/Interpersonal 
reactivity 
(2.1.2./2.2.2.) 
 Lower PT related to poorer everyday function (Smith et al., 2012)  
 Lower PT and higher PD (e.g. Montag et al, 2007).  
 Higher total IRI scores were associated with greater right IFG 
activity in healthy controls during the observation of emotional 
facial expressions (Horan et al, 2014) 
 Self-reported reduced cognitive perspective 
taking in everyday life, but increased distress 
when witnessing other people in distressing 
situations (Eddy et al., 2015) 
Non-literal 
language/prosody 
(2.1.2-2.1.3./2.2.2.) 
 Poor understanding of sarcasm, lies and paradoxical remarks from 
video-clips (e.g. Kosmidis et al., 2008). 
 Impaired perception and expression of emotional prosody (e.g. 
Hoekert et al, 2007).  
 Poor sarcasm perception linked to high PD (Sparks et al, 2010)  
 Impairments with prosody recognition correlate with deficits in 
 Less accurate interpretation of written 
sarcastic and metaphorical marks than 
controls (Eddy et al., 2010b).  
 No deficits on spoken emotional prosody task 
(Drury et al., 2012). 
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pitch perception (Kantrowitz et al, 2014). 
Faux pas task 
(2.1.3./2.2.3.) 
 Deficits in understanding faux pas but sometimes also errors on 
comprehension checks (e.g. Lam et al., 2015; de Achával et al., 
2010).  
 Poor performance can be linked to conversion in at-risk 
population (Zhang et al., 2016).  
 Poorer performance associated with reduced grey matter in 
VMPFC versus controls (Hooker et al., 2011). 
 Increased tendency to interpret faux pas as intentional (Shur et al., 
2008) 
 More errors and false alarms than controls but 
good performance on comprehension 
questions (Eddy et al., 2010a; Eddy et al., 
2011; Channon et al, 2012) 
 Increased tendency to interpret faux pas as 
intentional (Eddy et al., 2010a) 
Humorous cartoons 
(2.1.3.) 
 Selective deficits understanding jokes involving mentalizing but 
not slap stick style jokes in patients with paranoia or passivity 
(Corcoran et al., 1997). 
 Humour appreciation can be associated with severity of positive 
symptoms (Stratta et al., 2007) 
 Selection of more literal responses when 
explaining why a cartoon is meant to be 
funny. Most errors for cartoons featuring 
sarcasm. Normal performance for slapstick 
cartoons (Eddy et al., 2011) 
False-belief tasks 
(2.1.3./2.2.3.) 
 Reduced medial prefrontal activity during false-belief reasoning 
in schizophrenia patients with high social anhedonia, and this 
correlated with everyday social functioning (Dodell-Feder et al, 
2015)  
 Greater right TPJ activity during false-belief task linked to better 
emotion management (Dodell-Feder et al, 2015) 
 Errors on control questions (Scherzer et al., 2015) 
 Performance linked to positive and negative symptoms and IQ 
(Pickup & Frith, 2001) 
 Intact understanding of false-belief (Eddy et 
al., 2010a; Eddy et al., 2016) and deception 
(Channon et al., 2004) 
 Hypo-activation of brain areas involved in 
mentalizing (e.g. right temporo-parietal 
junction, posterior cingulate) during false-
belief task (Eddy et al., 2016) 
Animations task 
(2.1.3./2.2.3.) 
 Deficit  on mentalizing and simple interaction animations, longer 
answers on random (Russell et al, 2006) 
 Lower intentionality and appropriateness than controls linked to 
negative symptoms and functional capacity (Ventura et al, 2015).  
 Dysfunction in inferior frontal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus 
during this task (e.g. Pedersen et al., 2012) 
 Tendency to attribute intentions and mental 
states to animations showing random 
movement (Eddy & Cavanna, 2015) 
Gaze direction tasks 
(2.1.3.) 
 Deficit  on using gaze to infer beliefs and desires task linked to 
poor insight into own symptoms (Zhang et al, 2016).  
 Greater evidence for impairment on second order affective tasks 
involving gaze (e.g. Ho et al, 2015). 
 Difficulties making judgments about envy 
and gloating based on direction of eye gaze 
and facial expression (Eddy et al., 2011) 
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Table 2.  
Behavioural symptoms in schizophrenia and/or Tourette syndrome that may be related to impaired 
self-other distinctions 
Related social cognitive impairment Symptom/behavioural problem Result of impairment or compensatory? 
 
Poor differentiation between the mental 
states of self and other 
 
Socially inappropriate symptoms* 
 
Probably compensatory 
High personal distress 
 
Result 
Low perspective taking/avoidance of 
mentalizing 
Possibly compensatory  
Emotional dysregulation 
 
Result 
Impulsive nonconformity 
 
Probably compensatory 
Command hallucinations† Result (egodystonic urges may appear like 
impulsive non-conformity) 
Social anhedonia† 
 
Result or possibly compensatory  
Egocentricity†  
 
Result 
Alexithymia† 
 
Possibly compensatory  
Thought insertion† 
 
Result 
Delusions of control† 
 
Result 
Poor differentiation between the mental 
states of self and other/hyper-
mentalizing/intention attribution based 
on observed actions 
Paranoia† Result 
Basic intention attribution based on 
observed actions/events 
Thought action fusion Result 
Poor differentiation between the 
physical states/actions of self and other 
 
Tics* 
 
Probably compensatory 
Echophenomena* 
 
Result 
*Symptoms that appear most characteristic of TS; †symptoms that appear more characteristic of schizophrenia  
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Highlights 
 Schizophrenia and Tourette syndrome present notable similarities in social cognition 
 There is shared dysfunction in temporo-parietal junction and inferior frontal gyrus 
 Both disorders feature increased mirroring of emotion and decreased mentalizing 
 This pattern may underlie multiple symptoms including socially disruptive urges 
 Comparing disorders reveals common neurocognitive risk factors for social dysfunction 
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